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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Lacked Legal Authority To Reinstate Olivas On Probation On His 
Original Sentence Under Idaho Code§ 18-8311 
A. Introduction 
In 2011, while on probation for sexual abuse of a child, Olivas pleaded guilty to 
failure to register as a sex offender in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-8311. (R., pp.160-
62.) Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) requires that when a probationer violates SORA, his 
probation "shall be revoked and the penalty for violating this section shall be served 
consecutively to the original sentence." By requiring the sentences to be served 
consecutively, Idaho Code § 18-8311 precludes a district court from reinstating an 
offender on probation for their original offense because a suspended sentence is not 
served. The district court, therefore, lacked legal authority to reinstate Olivas on 
probation on his original offense of sexual abuse of a child. The order reinstating Olivas 
on probation should be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 94 P.3d 709,710 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Idaho Code§ 18-8311 Precludes A District Court From Reinstating Probation On 
The Original Offense 
By its unambiguous terms, Idaho Code§ 18-8311 does not permit a district court 
to reinstate an offender on probation. Rather, the statute requires that the district court 
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revoke probation on the original offense and impose a separate sentence for the SORA 
violation, and requires that the offender serve his sentence on the SORA violation 
"consecutively to the offender's original sentence." I.C. § 18-8311 (1 ). Because 
reinstatement on probation is precluded by the statute, the district court violated Idaho 
Code § 18-8311 by reinstating Olivas on probation on his original offense of sexual 
abuse of a child after his period of retained jurisdiction. 
In response, Olivas argues that the "district court did not violate I.C. 18-8311 
when it retained jurisdiction." (Respondent's brief, pp.4-12.) Olivas misapprehends the 
state's argument on appeal. The state has not argued that the district court is precluded 
under Idaho Code § 18-8311 from executing the original sentence but retaining 
jurisdiction for up to 365 days. 1 The state simply argues that a district court is precluded 
from reinstating an offender on probation by the unambiguous language of Idaho Code 
§ 18-8311(1), which requires that the sentences "be served consecutively." 
Olivas, citing State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho 656, 962 P.2d 1040 (1998), and 
State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779, 264 P.3d 418 (Ct. App. 2011), argues that Idaho Code§ 
18-8311 does not create a mandatory minimum prison term. (Respondent's brief, pp.6-
8.) This argument is irrelevant. The state has not argued that the statute creates a 
mandatory minimum sentence. The statute's requirement that the sentences "shall be 
served consecutively" requires only that the sentences be served consecutively. It does 
not mandate any specific amount of time of service. 
1 In fact, the state acknowledged that Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) gives the district court . 
this very authority. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) The state stresses, however, that retaining 
jurisdiction on the original offense is incompatible with the purpose of the retained 
jurisdiction program (evaluation in order to determine amenability to probation), because 
reinstatement on probation is precluded by the terms of Idaho Code§ 18-8311 (1 ). 
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Finally, committing the same error in both arguments, Olivas argues that nothing 
in Idaho Code § 18-8311 specifically precludes a court from reinstating probation or 
retaining jurisdiction (Respondent's brief, p.8-9), and that State v. Brown, 153 Idaho 
781, 291 P.3d 464 (Ct. App. 2011), was decided incorrectly (Respondent's brief, pp.10-
11 ). Olivas asserts that the Court in Brown "revised" Idaho Code § 18-8311 in order to 
"avoid the absurd result" of running Brown's SORA violation sentence concurrent to his 
original sentence. (Id.) Olivas misunderstands the Court of Appeals' opinion in Brown. 
Far from revising the statute to avoid concurrent sentences, the Court in Brown simply 
applied the plain language of the statute which mandates "the penalty for violating this 
chapter shall be served consecutively to the offender's original sentence." Brown, 153 
Idaho at , 291 P.3d at 466. 
Idaho accepts the cannon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio 
a/terius-where a "statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things 
excludes all others." Local 1494 of Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 
99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978) (citations omitted); see also 
lntermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial lndem. Co. of Idaho, 125 Idaho 182, 186, 868 P.2d 
510, 514 (Ct. App. 1994) (applying rule to interpretation of insurance policy which 
confined coverage to negligent acts without specifically excluding intentional acts, 
holding that policy was only intended to provide coverage for negligent acts). Contrary 
to Olivas's assertions, the Court of Appeals' opinion in Brown does not revise Idaho 
Code § 18-8311, but instead holds that by mandating consecutive sentences the plain 
language of the statute necessarily precludes concurrent sentencing. Likewise, the 
statute's requirement that probation "shall be revoked and the penalty for violating this 
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section shall be served consecutively to the original sentence" necessarily precludes 
reinstating an offender on probation on their original offense because a suspended 
sentence is not served. The state requests that, as in Brown, this Court apply the literal 
language of the statute requiring the offender to serve his consecutive sentences. 
Idaho Code § 18-8311 was adopted by the Idaho legislature as part of the 
"Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act." I.C. § 
18-8301, et seq. The legislature has codified its findings for this act as follows: 
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and 
that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, 
conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit 
sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available 
about individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live 
within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing public 
access to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists 
parents in the protection of their children. Such access further provides a 
means for organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable 
populations to prevent sexual offenders from threatening those served by 
the organizations. Finally, public access assists the community in being 
observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from 
recommitting sexual crimes. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist 
efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by 
requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies 
and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the 
public as provided in this chapter. 
I. C. § 18-8302. Because sexual offenders present a significant risk, failure to register is 
a significant offense for which the legislature intended a significant consequence. 
The language of Idaho Code § 18-8311 (1) is clear and unambiguous: "If the 
offender is on probation ... at the time of the violation, the probation ... shall be revoked 
and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served consecutively to the offender's 
original sentence." The statute expressly mandates that the sentences "shall be served 
4 
consecutively." The sentences cannot be served consecutively unless each is actually 
served. Suspending the original sentence and reinstating the offender on probation is 
not serving the original sentence. Idaho Code § 18-8311, therefore, does not permit a 
district judge to reinstate probation on the original sentence.2 
By reinstating Olivas on probation on his original offense of sexual abuse of a 
child, the district court violated Idaho Code § 18-8311. The district court's order 
reinstating probation should be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
reinstating Olivas on probation and remand this case for resentencing. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2013. 
(__----f..~~ J. SPENC; 
Deputy Attorney General 
2 While Idaho Code § 18-8311 reduces the district court's sentencing discretion by not 
allowing it to reinstate an offender on probation, the state is not arguing that the statute 
entirely eliminates the court's sentencing discretion. In this case, the state does not 
take a position as to whether a district court could reduce the original sentence, 
commute the original sentence, or execute the original sentence as indeterminate time 
only, thus making the offender immediately eligible for parole. The state only argues, 
consistent with the plain, unambiguous language of the statute that the sentences "shall 
be served consecutively," that Idaho Code§ 18-8311 does not permit a district court to 
reinstate probation. 
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